CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CCD/321
11 March 1971

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 MARCH 1971 TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE DELEGATIONS OF MEXICO, SWEDEN AND YUGOSLAVIA

On the occasion of the 500th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we would be grateful if you would issue as a document of the Conference the attached Declaration on Peace and Disarmament by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates which was presented to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on 21 September 1970.

Alfonso García Robles

Mexico

Alva Myrdal

Sweden

Milorad Bozinovic

Yugoslavia

GE.71-6041
71-08121

DECLARATION ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

By the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates

The year 1970 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations and the beginning of the Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the General Assembly. It should be a time of celebration and of hope for peace and disarmament. It is instead a time of disquiet and fear.

It is only too easy to understand why a decline of general interest, sometimes a sense of cynicism, and even a feeling of despair, have begun to cloud the efforts of nations to bring meaning to disarmament. The world remains divided. Violence spreads. The Middle East and South-East Asia are ravaged by war. New conflicts threaten. Distrust, tension and violence, not peace and disarmament, seem the realities of today.

The total world expenditure for military purposes had already reached the figure of 120,000 million dollars in 1962, the year when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee began its work. By 1969 it had risen to 200,000 million dollars. The "mad momentum" of the nuclear arms race still continues.

But whatever the immediate discouragement and frustration, it none the less remains as true today as it has always been that in the final analysis, reduction of armaments has to be a condition of world peace, and that the arms race is linked, whether as cause or effect does not matter, with unrest and suspicion between nations. The world has lulled itself into a state of mind which accepts armaments and the diversion of resources which they imply. It has lulled itself into a belief that it can live with nuclear weapons, that these and other armaments bring security. All they bring in fact is the threat of disaster. The world could never survive a nuclear holocaust. There is no hope without the kind of mutual understanding which measures of disarmament, however small, will help to bring about.

The 1960s witnessed the achievement of a number of treaties which show that progress towards disarmament can be made. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty establishing a Nuclear-free Zone in Latin America of 1967, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, are all witness to this fact. Each step which is taken provides a pointer to others which have still to be taken.

Unfortunately, despite these successes, there is increasing diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to unproductive and uneconomic military purposes.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has warned: "The world now stands at a most critical crossroads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s. If it should choose the latter road, the security, the economic well-being and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world, would be tremendously enhanced."

If civilization is not to suffer a set-back from which it might never recover, if man is to survive on our globe, it is imperative that the Disarmament Decade be made to live up to its name.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the USA and the USSR which are now taking place are a sign that the two "super-Powers" realize that the nuclear arms race gives them no security and that it must be curbed. All pray for their success; the consequences of failure can be fatal. They must halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. A mutual moratorium on the development and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons systems, such as the MIRVs and ABMs, is the most important first step.

Warfare may in the past have been associated with victory; and occasionally with peace. It is clear that it can no longer result in either. Let the Decade of Disarmament therefore bring with it an increasing realization that whatever its costs, whatever presumed advantages have to be ceded, the political settlement of international differences will in the end always prove less costly and less dangerous than any attempted settlement brought about by the force of arms. With this realization, may the nations of the world during the Disarmament Decade

finally embark on the reduction and elimination of the dreaded means of their destruction. Nothing less will rescue mankind from international anarchy and war.

(Signed)

Lord BOYD ORR
Lester B. PEARSON
René CASSIN
Philip NOEL-BAKER
Linus PAULING

Note: Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations, the only other living Laureate, feels that as a member of the Secretariat, he cannot be a signatory to the Declaration, but he fully agrees with the text and has endorsed it.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/322
16 March 1971

Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Working Paper on a model for a comprehensive agreement concerning the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare

I. In the intervention by the Swedish delegation on 9 March, 1971 (CCD/PV.499) a model for a comprehensive convention prohibiting the development, testing, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological means of warfare was tentatively described in general terms. In order to make the suggestions contained therein more easily comprehensible, they are outlined in the following in an abbreviated form. A "skeleton" of our ideas is thus presented. It should be underlined that the presented model is not complete - it deals primarily with the thorny issues of the scope of the prohibitions and procedures for verification - and that some of the suggestions are still very tentative. As a matter of fact both the intervention itself and this abbreviated presentation should primarily be regarded as stages in the "mapping expedition", covering the whole field of CBW, in which the CCD has been engaged for more than a year.

II. Scope of the prohibition

1. No prohibitory rules should be included in the presently discussed treaty against use of CBW which is dealt with in a comprehensive way in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

2. The treaty should contain a principal overriding regulation, indicating the undertaking by the Parties "not to develop, test, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and biological weapons".

3. This general undertaking ought to be complemented with a prohibitory rule against all transfers of weapons between Parties.

4. Two corollary obligations to the general prohibition concerning weapons would follow:

(a) the first concerned with destruction or other disposal of existing stocks of chemical and biological means of warfare;

(b) the second concerned with the training of troops in offensive combat with CBW, instructions on such methods in military manuals etc.

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5. There would follow a subsidiary set of prohibitions, concerned with the agents which constitute C and B weapons or are integral components of such weapons. These prohibitions would refer to production, testing and stockpiling, as well as transfers (export) of the agents.

6. The agents would be separated into two categories according to two technical criteria:

(a) Category (a) would compromise those agents, whether chemical, toxins or biological which have a practically exclusive use as potential means of warfare. They would, at the same time, be those agents which are super-toxic. In the chemical field this category would include all substances more toxic than 1 mg per kg body weight. It would thus i.a. comprise the chemical components of nerve gases and mustards, as well as all toxins;

(b) Category (b) would comprise all remaining chemical agents, less toxic than indicated by the above mentioned formula and which can be used as means of warfare but also have recognized peaceful uses. This would be the main category comprising such chemicals as hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, tear gases and defoliants. Also most biological agents would belong to this category in so far as they are produced for non-military purposes, e.g. for immunization.

7. There would, finally, be a third category, category (c), comprising ancillary equipment or vectors, specifically designed for using chemical and biological agents as means of warfare.

III. Verification

1. The verification procedures would probably have to be largely concentrated to the area of the agents. Suspicions of violations of the overall prohibition against CB weapons would have to be taken care of within the framework of a detailed complaints procedure. The same procedure would cover suspicions of violations against the corollary prohibitions against military training, army manuals etc.

2. The details of the complaints procedure will have to be worked out carefully. It should take the form of a system of successive steps, including consultations between the parties and other fact-finding measures. The final step would consist of a possibility of lodging a complaint with the UN Security Council.

3. Destruction and disposal of existing stocks of CBW would also have to be verified, preferably through an international procedure.

4. The more specific verification procedures would be concentrated on the agents. They would comprise a combination of national and international control measures.

The most rigorous methods of control would be those dealing with category (a) above, i.e. chemicals more toxic than 1 mg per kg body weight, toxins and biological agents without any recognized peaceful use.

The production of these compounds would in principle be prohibited. Any deviation from this general rule would have to be reported to an international agency, the report giving the reasons for the production (scientific use, protective measures etc). In case of any large-scale production (i.e. over one kg) or in case of suspected undeclared production, the international agency might be entitled to conduct an on-site inspection, either on the invitation of the producing or suspected party, or obligatory.

5. The compounds comprising category (b) as well as the ancillary equipment and vectors in category (c) would be controlled by national means only, such national control possibly in some cases complemented by statistical reporting by the parties to an international agency; they would further be subject, if suspicion was aroused, to the sequence of processes foreseen in the complaints procedure, i.e. through consultation and challenge and, in the final instance, by a reference of the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations.

6. If and when new technical developments would allow more stringent verification procedures on the categories (b) and (c), agreement should be sought to shift them to category (a).

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/323
18 March 1971
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THE NETHERLANDS

Working Paper concerning seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions

1. Introduction

The Netherlands Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has considered the materials presented to this Body on the question of the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions, together with the relevant data from open literature. The delegation thought it worthwhile to summarize the data most pertinent to this question in order to facilitate discussions. It has summarized a substantial part of these data in two figures reproduced in this paper.

The excellent Canadian report of November 1970 on Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions by P.W. Basham and K. Whitham has been the main source of the information presented in the figures, including the magnitude-yield relation.

2. Existing capabilities

A summary of the existing seismic capabilities for identification of underground nuclear explosions, especially in the Northern Hemisphere, is given in the upper part of Figure 1. More detailed information for the different test sites is given in Figure 2.

In both figures a detection and location capability for earthquakes (Q) and explosions (E) is indicated where there is a 90 per cent probability that each of at least four seismic monitoring stations can detect and locate the earthquake or explosion by measuring the body (P) wave. In the Northern Hemisphere the lower limit of this detection and location capability (indicated by 4P90) for earthquakes and explosions is between magnitude m_B-values of 4.2 and 4.4. This corresponds to an explosion yield of about 3 kiloton in hard rock. The P-wave detection capability is given by thin lines in fig. 1.

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The capability to identify earthquakes and explosions is presented in the form of bars in the figures. This discrimination between earthquakes and explosions is based on the surface (R) wave/body (P) wave ratio, which is quite different for the two kinds of events. Positive identification of earthquakes is possible for m_B-values of 4.8-5.1, while for explosions this is 5.8-6.1. The possibility of positive identification is interpreted here as a 90 per cent probability that each of at least four seismic monitoring stations can identify at this threshold value the earthquake or explosion as such by measuring the amplitudes of the R-wave and P-wave. This capability is indicated by 4R90 in the figures.

In connexion with a comprehensive test ban, lower identification probabilities for explosions are also considered. In figure 1 these are presented in the form of bars for a 50 per cent and a 20 per cent probability of identification by four stations each. For example, the identification threshold is lowered to m_B 5.1-5.4 at the 20 per cent probability level for each of four stations (4R20). In figure 2 other identification probabilities are also given.

Another possibility to identify an explosion can be found by using a "negative" criterion, that is the absence of R-waves when one would expect these in the case of an earthquake. An estimate of this identification capability is indicated in fig. 1.

From the upper part of figure 1 it can be concluded that the present seismic monitoring system in the Northern Hemisphere can identify with a reasonable probability explosions with a magnitude m_B 5.5 or a yield of about 50 kton in hard rock. Earthquakes can be identified above m_B 4.8-5.1 with a high degree of confidence.

3. Potential capabilities

Several methods to increase the identification capabilities for underground nuclear explosions have been proposed and/or are investigated at present (see the lower part of fig. 1).

a. Specific studies of events at the Nevada Test Site have made clear that, by a study of R_g-waves, an identification threshold of m_B 5.0 may actually be reached. R_g is the surface wave, guided within the continental part of the earth crust only, and consequently restricted to purely continental source-receiver path ways. It seems likely that with the existing station network this type of wave could effectively be used for other continental test site - station combinations.

b. In theory the ratio of the body (P) wave frequencies can be used down to the level of its detection, which should mean to magnitude m_B-values of 4.2-4.4. In practice this method, which makes use of the (spectral) characteristics of the measured body (P) wave itself (thus not using a combination of body (P) and surface (R) waves), has at least been realized down to m_B 4.9 for certain test site-station combinations. It seems likely that the highly successful work on this P-wave spectral ratio discriminant, as developed by the United Kingdom research group, by additional studies could be extended to magnitude values nearer to the threshold of P-wave detection. In any case the method can be used without undue extension of the present seismic monitoring system.

c. An important capability increase could be achieved by the use of the new high-gain long-period vertical seismometer (LPZ), as developed by research groups in the United States of America. Using these instruments the surface (R) wave spectral ratio criterion can be extended down to a magnitude of 5.3 and the R-wave/P-wave ratio method down to m_B 4.9. Moreover, the absence of surface (R) waves in the records of this instrument may constitute an important indication for the explosion character of an event down to m_B-values of 4.4, which corresponds with a hard-rock yield of about 4 kton. The installation of a limited number of high quality high gain LPZ recorders could thus become of major significance in improving the identification system.

d. The last mentioned threshold values are of the same order as envisaged to be reached by the 26 extended seismic array system as described by the United Kingdom Delegation in document CCD/296. It can be expected however that the 26 array system will be much more expensive than the installation of a limited number of LPZ instruments.

In fig. 1 (lower part) estimates of the potential capabilities of the different systems are indicated. At present no exact identification probabilities can be given.

4. Additional identification improvements

a. A better and more detailed structural analysis of the crust and upper mantle of the earth should help in lowering the existing threshold values by a more effective use of the "matched filtering" process. A gain of 0.2 magnitude units has been obtained for some of the test site - station combinations. Eventually this same gain could be reached for any other place in the Northern Hemisphere, which would mean a lowering of the threshold yield value by a factor of 2/3.

b. Knowledge of the predominant type of radiation of seismic waves in the seismic zones of the earth could be of great importance in the interpretation of the records of an event of unknown type. The identification of earthquakes will be made more effective and herewith the discrimination against underground nuclear explosions.

c. For the understanding of the processes of energy transfer in earthquakes and explosions additional studies on the magnitude-yield relation of explosions in different types of media are needed. The question has already been raised if the use of surface wave magnitudes is not to be preferred to the body wave magnitude-scale m_B which is normally used in this work. It seems likely that a more consistent explanation of the data, and therewith of the identification of suspected events, might be reached.

d. Other, non-seismic, methods of detection of underground nuclear explosions, have been envisaged. Cratering occurs for explosions of about 20 kton and more in thick layers of dry soil, as mentioned in the SIPRI report [1] (see also fig. 1). Extensive mining works are necessary for the seismic decoupling of underground explosions in hard rock, although it is unclear whether such decoupling is possible for interesting yields. Both cratering and mining can probably be detected by satellites.

A multi-variate analysis of the whole scale of possibilities mentioned above inevitably will lead to an increase of the weight of the conclusions based on the individual methods.

5. Suggestions

The work on the P wave spectral ratio, as developed by the United Kingdom, should be elaborated and extended to lower magnitude events.

The installation of an appropriate limited network of high gain LPZ instruments, as developed by the United States of America, could be particularly helpful.

Additional study of crust and upper mantle structure, and of the radiation characteristics of shallow earthquakes in regions that in future could be used as test-sites, should be encouraged.

Support should be given to studies directed to the solution of the magnitude-yield relation in different types of media, and to the question of seismic efficiency.

1/ Seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions, SIPRI, Stockholm Papers no. 2.

6. Conclusions

It has been shown that the existing, more or less routine-based, facilities can identify 50 kton events in hard rock. By the inclusion of other types of discriminants this identification in principle could be extended to hard-rock yields of 10-20 kton, using the present monitoring system. With an additional installation at selected places of high gain LPZ seismometers another threshold reduction of a factor of two might be realized.

Also in that case, however, a supposed test-ban treaty could be evaded by a test programme of yields of 10 kton and less in dry soil that, in the case of sufficient thickness of the layer, will remain undetected and unidentified by seismological means or by observations of cratering.

With the most optimistic views in mind on the future development of seismic identification techniques, it can still be said that this 10 kton threshold will not be lowered within the next five years.


MAGNITUDE
4
5
6
m_B
DETECTION
• LOCATION
IDENTIFICATION
EXISTING CAPABILITIES
Q
E
N.AM
4R90
4P90
4R90
4R50
EUR
4R20
ABSENCE R
Q
E
ASIA
4R90
4P90
4R90
4R50
4R20
ABSENCE R
Q
E
S. HEM
4R90
4P90
4R50
4R20
ABSENCE R
POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES (N. HEM.)
R_g
SPECTRAL RATIO P
Q
E
LPZ
20 SEC R
40-60 SEC R
R
SPECTRAL RATIO R
ABSENCE R
UK 26 E
4P90
3R90
HARD ROCK
YIELD
3
5
10
30
50
100 K TON
300
500
10
20
(50)
(100)
(1000)
K TON
DRY SOIL
CRATERING IN DRY SOIL

FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2

PRESENT SEISMIC CAPABILITIES.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/324
30 March 1971
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SWEDEN

Working Paper on the destruction of chemical and biological means of warfare

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has called upon all states to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons. One aspect of this elimination is destruction of already existing chemical and biological means of warfare as foreseen both in the nine countries' revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/8136) and in the revised text of the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (CCD/255/Rev.2).

Different attempts have been made to solve the problem of disposing of chemical and biological means of warfare. Recently, an operation whereby chemical munitions (rockets) containing nerve gas were sunk in the Atlantic became widely known and was extensively reported on (see "Hearings before the Sub-committee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; House of Representatives Aug 3, 4, 6 and 7, 1970, Washingon, D.C."). This report dealt thoroughly with several means of disposal and destruction and also provided the information that some types of equipment for destruction was under construction.

In the present working paper the principles of destruction of both chemical and biological means of warfare are outlined. An element of importance that has been taken into account is that the effectiveness of the destruction should be easily observed and verified.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

The following is applicable to nerve and mustard gases which are considered to be representative of the most dangerous compounds and, furthermore, are stockpiled in various parts of the world in great quantities. Such agents may be stockpiled in various ways which cause different technical problems when it comes to destruction.

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They may, e.g., be stockpiled in

(a) containers in which the agents are easily accessible;

(b) munitions, containing explosives and perhaps propellants, from which the agents are accessible without prior defusing;

(c) munitions, the explosive part of which has to be defused before it can be emptied of the agent.

In the cases (b) and (c) the explosive part of the munitions causes special problems, particularly in the latter case where simultaneous destruction of the explosive part and the agents seems unavoidable. Thus, from the point of view of destruction, two alternatives can be anticipated:

(1) pure agents

(2) agents which are inseparable from munitions.

In the case of a pure agent two principally different methods for the destruction are conceivable.

One is by means of reactive chemicals (in a water solution) which detoxify the agent and the second, which is also more likely to be generally applicable, by thermal destruction (i.e., decomposition by heating/pyrolysis/or combustion).

The chemical method may involve use of alkali or oxidants (e.g., bleach). Chemical destruction generally gives nontoxic end-products, but the character of the products makes them an environmental hazard if introduced directly into the open, the ground, sea, lakes or rivers. The question of how to dispose of large quantities of the end-products, derived from the different chemical destruction methods, will have to be investigated further. Special facilities may have to be constructed.

Heating the agents themselves in autoclaves is technically feasible but may lead to some complex end-products about which relatively little is known.

Combustion, in combination with absorption of potential pollutants from the exhaust gases, appears to be the most promising method - technically and from the point of view of environmental pollution. A suitable combustion process would require specially constructed facilities.

The advantage of the thermal destruction methods would be that smaller destruction units might be used for a given amount of the agents and that the end-products are more easily handled. Actual experiments would have to be performed to evaluate the order of the most feasible technical steps.

In the case of munitions from which the agent cannot be separated easily, much more drastic procedures seem to be necessary. Use of underground nuclear explosions has been discussed and found technically feasible but were discarded in the earlier mentioned case for several reasons, among them the risks involved in handling the defective munitions (Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; House of Representatives Aug 3, 4, 5 and 7, Washington, D.C. 1970). Instead, the formerly widely used method of disposal by sinking the munitions in the sea was applied. The agents, when released from their containers, will be destroyed by chemical reactions with the sea water in due time. However, this method will be less attractive with regard to some of the nerve gases and the mustard gases, which need a considerably longer period to react with water. In addition, attention should be paid to the provisions of the recent Seabed Treaty which prohibit, i.a., the storing of chemical and biological weapons on the seabed.

Another less attractive alternative is treatment of the munitions with lime or bleach in old mines or underground in places chosen with great care.

Underwater detonation in closed-off water-filled pools together with facilities to take care of the toxic gases that may escape from the water surface might be feasible. Any of the mentioned methods are cumbersome. However, the greatest part of the existing chemical warfare agents can apparently be destroyed as such and according to the procedures suggested for pure agents.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Biological agents may be destroyed by combustion, in autoclave or by means of disinfectants. Also, destruction of biological agents has its hazards, but offers in general smaller problems than chemical agents, especially since the quantities to be destroyed, and accordingly also the quantities of end-products, should be much smaller than is the case with the chemical warfare agents. Various destruction facilities intended for ordinary peaceful purposes already exist.

CONCLUSION

The destruction of munitions and agents intended for chemical and biological warfare is technically feasible. Because of the high toxicity and infectiousness of the agents, hazards may in certain cases cause considerable destruction costs due to the need for special technical facilities. The destruction methods recommended above may be subject to verification without major technical difficulties, but apparently only with inspectors present at the site of destruction.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

GOVT PUBL DEPT

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction

by

the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament and, above all, with a view to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear, chemical, bacteriological (biological) and all other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins, and their elimination, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes.

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Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Guided by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 as well as the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and any biological means of warfare,

Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Convinced that an agreement on bacteriological (biological) weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued,

Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire:

(1) microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not designed for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes;

(2) auxiliary equipment or means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents or toxins for hostile purposes.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the Convention — observing all the necessary precautions -- or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated weapons in its possession as well as the equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention.

Article III

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations to take action contrary to the provisions of this Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal or physical persons of that State.

Article V

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention, and for destroying them.

Article VI

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

Article VII

1. Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for carrying out any use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.

Article X

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, so as to be sure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

Article XIII

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ..... which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ..... Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and shall transmit other notices to them.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XIV

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in ....., copies at ....., this .....
day of ....., ...

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CCD/325/Rev.1*
15 April 1971
ENGLISH and SPANISH ONLY
Original: RUSSIAN

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, ROMANIA, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction

by

the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament and, above all, with a view to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear, chemical, bacteriological (biological) and all other types of weapons of mass destruction,

Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes,

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* Revised text issued for technical reasons.

GE.71-6407
71-10688

Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Guided by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 as well as the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and any biological means of warfare,

Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Convinced that an agreement on bacteriological (biological) weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued,

Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire:

(1) microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not designed for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes;

(2) auxiliary equipment or means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents or toxins for hostile purposes.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the Convention — observing all the necessary precautions -- or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated weapons in its possession as well as the equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention.

Article III

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations to take action contrary to the provisions of this Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal or physical persons of that State.

Article V

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention, and for destroying them.

Article VI

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

Article VII

1. Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.

Article X

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XI

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In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in ..... copies at ....., this .....
day of ....., ...

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/326
6 April 1971

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letter dated 6 April 1971 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic has delivered to the delegation of the USSR in the Committee on Disarmament a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and has requested that it be brought to the attention of all States Members of the Committee. The aforesaid statement sets out the position of the German Democratic Republic with regard to problems of disarmament and limitation of the arms race, which are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

I request you to arrange for my letter to be circulated by the Secretariat of the Committee together with the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic attached thereto as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(signed) A. ROSHCHIN

Representative of the USSR in the Committee on Disarmament

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71-08130

Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

The Government of the German Democratic Republic attaches great importance to questions of disarmament and arms limitation which are on the agenda of the 1971 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A solution to these problems would help towards curbing the arms race, in particular in the field of weapons of mass destruction, and would pave the way to more extensive disarmament measures.

For this reason, the Government of the German Democratic Republic deems it appropriate to set out its position with regard to questions that are under discussion at the present session of the Committee on Disarmament.

I

The Government of the German Democratic Republic strongly supports any effort aimed at reducing and eliminating the dangers arising from weapons of mass destruction. In this connexion, it notes with satisfaction that the consistent struggle of a majority of States for a ban on bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons has brought about its first results, and that further progress is to be expected. At present it is necessary to take such measures as would remove such weapons from the arsenals of States.

In accordance with the position of the majority of States, the German Democratic Republic pursues the aim of eliminating bacteriological and chemical weapons once and for all, because the very existence and stockpiling of such weapons constitute an extremely great danger to the security of peoples. In this connexion, the Government of the German Democratic Republic again speaks out decisively against the use of such weapons by the United States of America in Indo-China.

Particularly alarming is the fact that these weapons of mass destruction are stockpiled in densely populated areas, as is done in the case of the US combat weapons located with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its territory in the immediate vicinity of the State borders of the German Democratic Republic. In addition, scientific institutes of the Federal Republic of Germany are working on the development of new types of such weapons.

In the interests of achieving further progress towards a complete ban on bacteriological and chemical weapons, the Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes and supports the Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction submitted by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty which are Members of the Committee on Disarmament, and by the Mongolian People's Republic.

Such an agreement would provide for the complete prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction and would stress the significance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and in the first place its provision prohibiting the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. The obligation to continue negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction expresses readiness to take action to eliminate these weapons, too.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic also fully approves the obligation contained in the draft convention under which the States parties undertake to take as soon as possible, the necessary legal and administrative measures for the prohibition of bacteriological weapons.

The Constitution and the Penal Code of the German Democratic Republic stipulate that any misuse of science directed against peace, mutual understanding among peoples, against the life and dignity of man is prohibited and that the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons is subject to punishment.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic assures the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it will, within the bounds of its possibilities, work actively for the achievement and speedy conclusion of the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and their destruction. Moreover, it will continue to advocate the adoption of effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

II

The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, which has recently been open for signature, is an important success in the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It signed the Treaty on the first day it was open for signature. The Treaty provides further evidence that it is possible to achieve measures for arms limitation and disarmament and that negotiations on these questions can be useful and fruitful if the participants conduct them with a sense of responsibility and in a spirit of good will and seek to achieve agreements which will benefit all peoples.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic would welcome the provision of the Sea-Bed Treaty for the prohibition of any military use of the sea-bed to be carried out soon.

III

The Government of the German Democratic Republic feels that in view of the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind, measures in regard to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament are of particularly great importance.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that the universal application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the speedy coming into force of the safeguards agreements between the IAEA and the parties to the Treaty as provided for by the Treaty are key questions in the international struggle for disarmament and arms limitation.

On 25 August 1970 the German Democratic Republic officially declared its readiness to the IAEA immediately to start negotiations for the conclusion of a safeguard agreement as provided for by Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States, in particular by those which have capabilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons, is necessary and urgent. This applies especially to the Federal Republic of Germany whose Government has so far not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has not yet entered into negotiations with IAEA for the conclusion of a safeguards agreement.

IV

Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of resolution 1653 (XVI) on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, but the basic principles of that resolution have still not been confirmed by a treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic still considers the draft convention on that question submitted by the USSR at the XXII United Nations General Assembly to be a good basis for such a prohibition. A convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to which all nuclear weapon States would subscribe would be an effective contribution towards peace and the security of peoples. Such a convention would undoubtedly facilitate the adoption in the future of measures to limit, reduce and finally destroy nuclear weapon potentials.

V

The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests is another important measure feasible today for limiting nuclear armaments. Already the Non-Proliferation Treaty referred to such a prohibition as being one of the most urgent measures.

In view of the progress that has been made in identifying underground nuclear weapon tests by national means of detection, the achievement of such a treaty depends exclusively on whether the USA is finally prepared to give up underground nuclear weapon testing.

The German Democratic Republic is prepared to participate in an international exchange of seismic data within the framework of a universal treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests which would respect the principles of the sovereign equality of States.

VI

The Government of the German Democratic Republic, as in the past, regards general and complete disarmament as one of the most noble objectives of its policy. It reaffirms its readiness to support any proposal likely to bring mankind nearer to the achievement of this goal.

Agreements limiting the arms race in nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction improve the prospects for the achievement of agreements in other fields conducive to general and complete disarmament. Such measures would increase international security.